Labor-Market Regimes in U.S. Economic History by Joshua L. Rosenbloom & William A. Sundstrom
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We thank Alex Field and Tom Weiss for their perceptive comments on earlier versions of this essay.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Joshua L. Rosenbloom and William A. Sundstrom. All rights reserved. Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Labor-Market Regimes in U.S. Economic History
Joshua L. Rosenbloom and William A. Sundstrom




In much economic analysis it is a convenient fiction to suppose that changes over time in wages and
employment are determined by shifts in supply or demand within a more or less competitive market
framework Indeed, this framework has been effectively deployed to understand many episodes in American
economic history.  We argue here, however, that by minimizing the role of labor-market institutions
such an approach is incomplete.  Drawing on the history of American labor markets over two centuries,
we argue that institutions—by which we mean both formal and informal rules that constrain the choices
of economic agents—have played a significant role in the determination of wages, employment and
other market outcomes over time.  The historical evolution of American labor markets can best be
characterized as a sequence of relatively stable arrangements punctuated by shifts in institutional regimes.
Our narrative emphasizes the importance of understanding the historically contingent role of institutional
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Introduction 
  The 30-year trend of rising income inequality in the United States has led to heightened 
interest among labor economists in assessing the role of labor-market institutions in the 
determination of wages and other market outcomes. The central role of institutions governing 
work and compensation is a venerable theme in economics. Adam Smith famously held that the 
incentives associated with labor systems could explain the relative success of countries like 
England and the backwardness of economies based on slavery or metayage. Karl Marx based his 
stages theory of economic development on the nature of the relationship between workers and 
property holders under different economic regimes. Recently, economists and economic 
historians have revisited the long-run impact of institutions on economic growth and 
performance in an effort to understand the divergent fortunes of different countries and regions.
1 
The economic history of the United States presents a kind of laboratory for research on 
labor-market institutions and their impact. The contrast between the labor systems of chattel 
slavery in the cotton South and free wage labor in the industrializing North plays a leading role 
in our understanding of patterns of regional development in the antebellum period. After the 
Civil War, regional differences persisted, but much of the action shifted to the evolution of 
industrial and postindustrial labor markets, from the relatively unfettered competitive 
environment of the late nineteenth century to the emergence of a federally regulated and more 
centralized bargaining system by the 1950s. The partial unraveling of that system in recent 
decades is one of the prime suspects in the trend toward greater inequality. 
No economist has spent more time in this laboratory, or produced more significant 
results, than Gavin Wright. In this chapter, our goal is to sketch a broad interpretation of the 
                                                           
1 On the role of institutional heritage on long-run economic development see Acemoglu et al (2001); Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997). 
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evolution of American labor markets, building on a key concept that informs Wright’s work on 
both southern economic history and the growth of the U.S. industrial economy since the late 
nineteenth century—namely, what we will refer to as labor-market institutional regimes. We 
begin by providing a conceptual framework, defining what we mean by institutions and making a 
case for why labor-market institutions may be expected to exhibit both coherence and 
persistence—the defining traits of an institutional regime. We then begin our historical narrative 
with the familiar contrast between the labor systems of the antebellum northern and southern 
economies, and proceed through the dramatic changes in labor-market regimes wrought by the 
Civil War and later by the World Wars and the Great Depression. These regime shifts shaped not 
only important labor-market outcomes, such as wages, working conditions, and employment, but 
also the dynamics of technology and human capital accumulation. An important conclusion, 
which we draw from Wright’s work and from the events recounted in our narrative, is that trends 
in the underlying economic “fundamentals” that are often given causal primacy are themselves 
partly the endogenous product of institutional regimes. 
 
Labor-market regimes 
  The institutions of the labor market can be defined as the principal rules and 
organizations governing the transactions between the buyers and sellers of labor. In this context 
rules should be conceived broadly to include both formal laws and property rights—enforceable 
in the courts—and implicit or informal behavioral norms. Familiar examples of formal legal 
rules affecting the U.S. labor market would be the 13
th Amendment to the Constitution, which by 
abolishing involuntary servitude established free labor as the standard form of property rights in 
labor nationwide, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which set broad, legally enforceable 
minimum wages and maximum hours for most workers. An example of an informal rule, widely   4
observed in labor markets of the pre-civil rights South, was the requirement that in mixed-race 
workplaces a black worker may never supervise a white worker (Dewey 1952). 
The distinction between institutions on the one hand and what are merely widespread 
contractual arrangements or patterns of behavior on the other is a fuzzy one. If almost all 
workers receive paid vacation time as part of their employment contract, are paid vacations 
“institutionalized,” or merely an equilibrium form of non-wage compensation? We take the view 
here that institutions are something more than common patterns of behavior; they must constrain 
individual choices and contracts beyond the constraints determined by prices and endowments. 
In the case of legal regulations such as the minimum wage, the constraint is a rule that can be 
enforced by the state. Informal norms are not legally enforceable, but may be enforced through 
extra-legal social sanctions, such as ostracism or reciprocity. Finally, we include standardization 
of contractual terms as additional institutional constraints. Given transaction costs and bounded 
rationality, participants in the market may adhere to a coordinating equilibrium in which the 
range of contractual options is narrowed by convention—a familiar example from economic 
history is the conventional 50-50 split of the harvest between worker and landlord under 
sharecropping, with adjustment to changing market conditions being made along other margins, 
such as plot size. 
  The institutional features of labor markets differ considerably across political settings as 
well as industries and even individual firms. In the sizeable literature that has emerged in recent 
years attempting to classify and describe the variation of labor-market institutions across 
countries and assess their impact on economic performance, as measured by growth, 
unemployment, and inequality, the term “institutions” is often used as shorthand for the extent of 
governmental regulation of labor markets and the relative influence of unions or collective 
bargaining.  We should be clear that while these factors are an important dimension of labor   5
market institutions we intend a broader definition here. There is widespread acknowledgment 
that in the universe of developed economies, labor markets in the United States tend to lie at the 
laissez faire end of the spectrum, but the implications for economic outcomes remain in dispute. 
In a useful survey, Freeman (2007) suggests that the one robust finding from studies of 
comparative labor-market performance is that institutions have significant effects on income 
distribution, with the more regulated and centralized wage-setting regimes of continental Europe 
exhibiting less inequality than the less-regulated Anglo-American regimes. The wage regulation 
and employment rigidities associated with European labor institutions have also often been 
blamed for higher rates of unemployment and sluggish employment growth, although the 
evidence is more mixed for these effects. 
  As we document in this chapter, it is also clear that within a given national setting labor-
market institutions are subject to considerable temporal change. U.S. labor markets may now be 
thought of as a relatively unregulated “wild west” by developed capitalist standards, but even in 
America centralized federal regulation increased substantially over the course of the past 
century. These changes did not occur along a steady, continuous path; rather, periods of relative 
stasis in the basic rules of the game were punctuated by episodes of rapid change. Emancipation 
and the New Deal are perhaps the most obvious instances of such “revolutionary” episodes in 
U.S. labor-market history. Furthermore, the direction of change is not necessarily monotonic. 
While U.S. labor markets are subject to more government regulation today than they were a 
century ago, it is certainly arguable that the same period witnessed the rise and then fall of 
centralized wage bargaining institutions, and therefore that U.S. labor markets more closely 
resembled those of contemporary continental Europe in the 1950s than they do today. 
  Although labor-market institutions vary across countries, regions, and periods of time, the 
question arises whether it makes sense to think of the configuration of institutional elements in a   6
particular time and place as constituting a coherent institutional regime or system rather than a 
mere collection of rules and laws. The idea of such an institutional regime should be familiar to 
readers of Gavin Wright’s seminal work on slavery and the postbellum American South. In 
contrasting the developmental paths of the slave South and the free-labor North, Wright stresses 
ways in which each region’s system of property rights over labor shaped private incentives as 
well as political interests and behavior, with profound implications for the path of economic 
development (Wright 1978; 2006a). With the Civil War and emancipation, the labor-market 
institutions of South and North necessarily converged in terms of basic property rights, but 
Wright (1986) argues that the South retained a distinctive regional labor-market regime for 
decades, one that rested on geographical isolation, political domination by the planter class, 
disfranchisement of African-Americans, inferior education, and low wages. 
We argue here that an institutional regime must exhibit two characteristics: coherence 
and persistence (or path dependence). By coherence we mean that important institutional 
elements are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and therefore tend to occur together as a 
set. For example, the mid-twentieth century high-wage regime depicted by Wright (2006b) 
emerged behind the protective barrier of restrictive immigration policy, which not only 
contributed to the high-wage equilibrium itself by reducing labor supply and making it less 
elastic, but also helped protect organized labor from immigrant strikebreaking and thus 
complemented the legal protection and sometimes active governmental promotion of collective 
bargaining. It is at least arguable that a regime with widespread collective bargaining is 
incompatible in the long run with free immigration. By contrast, in the labor regime of the early 
twentieth-century South, lower state spending on education was consistent with the regional 
political-economic strategy of maintaining a comparative advantage in low-wage industries and 
an isolated low-wage labor market by limiting information and opportunities for mobility of the   7
workforce. 
  Once established, institutional regimes are sticky, with periods of relative institutional 
stability punctuated by crisis periods of relatively rapid change. Paul David (1994) notes three 
important factors that make institutions path dependent, or as he puts it the “carriers of history.” 
First, institutions facilitate coordination among agents by creating mutually consistent 
expectations; in other words, institutional rules and norms are standards. Common language, 
social conventions, and the delineation of social roles all permit agents to economize on 
information gathering and learning in social transactions. In the context of labor markets, 
exchange is facilitated if workers can expect that the basic contractual rules of the game are 
common across employers. These rules could include legal rights, such as common-law rules 
governing workplace liability, or terms and conditions of the employment relationship, such as 
standard hours of labor and pay periods or labor’s share of the harvest. Standards serve to reduce 
the dimensionality of the labor contract (which could otherwise be extraordinarily complex), 
thereby reducing the costs of evaluating and negotiating terms. Because the gains from adopting 
a behavioral standard or convention are a function of how many others have adopted the same 
standard, such conventions are subject to increasing returns and potential lock-in effects (David 
1986). 
  A second, related source of historical persistence in an institutional regime is learning. 
The information channels, codes, and conventions that facilitate labor transactions must, like a 
language, be learned by individuals and organizations. These investments in human and 
organizational capital are largely irreversible, in the sense that the stock of knowledge is not 
readily transferable to new institutional settings.
2 Third, institutional complementarities 
themselves can increase rigidity by increasing the costs of adjusting any single institutional 
                                                           
2 The role of irreversible investments in generating path dependence is stressed by Arrow (2004).   8
element. During the 1960s and 1970s, for example, racial integration of job ladders in some 
southern industries was hampered not only by lingering racial hostilities on the part of white 
workers, but by vested interests created under the seniority system (Minchin 2007). 
  The path dependence of institutional regimes obviously does not imply that institutions 
are completely exogenous to broader historical and economic forces, but it does give them an 
important codetermining role in shaping economic outcomes over fairly long periods of time. 
Institutional regimes affect not only the static equilibrium of the labor market—the level and 
distribution of wages, employment and unemployment—but the dynamics of the market as well. 
In particular, institutions shape the evolution of the technologies and endowments often 
considered to be market fundamentals.  
In this chapter we discuss several important illustrative cases from U.S. labor market 
history, including the impact of slavery on southern economic development and the contrasting 
role of free labor in the industrializing North, and the implications of the “high-wage” 
institutional regime of the mid-twentieth century for productivity growth and human capital 
accumulation. With regard to the latter case, Wright (2006b, p. 158) argues that “... the primary 
causal influence ran from the labor market to productivity rather than the other way round,” with 
labor-market outcomes affecting not only the choice of technique along a static isoquant, but the 
very pace of technological progress. At the risk of oversimplifying some complex arguments, we 
suggest that this neo-institutionalist view may be contrasted with the important work of Goldin 
and Katz, summarized in their recent book (2008), which emphasizes a more conventionally 
neoclassical causal story: technological change is the fundamental driver of labor demand, the 
existing stock of skills determines labor supply, and investment in education responds 
endogenously in the long run to the relative price of skills. But even in the Goldin and Katz 
narrative, political institutions play a central role in the accumulation of human capital, and   9
labor-market institutions such as unions and regulation play at least a supporting part in 
determining the wage structure in the medium run. As in many cases where there are competing 
institutional and neoclassical narratives, historical studies can help sort out the relative 
importance of these causal influences. 
 
Legal Foundations of American Labor Markets 
  The legal foundations of employment law in the United States and Britain developed 
from common precedents in the seventeenth century, but different circumstances led to divergent 
practices.  This divergence was sharpened in the wake of the American Revolution, when the 
abolition of slavery across the northern states led Americans toward a distinctive conception of 
the meaning of “free labor.”  In many respects these legal foundations have exerted a persistent 
effect on American labor markets even into the present day, contributing to the relatively high 
levels of mobility and competition that characterize American labor markets. 
  In colonial British North America a variety of different and overlapping arrangements 
concerning property rights in labor coexisted with one another.  At one extreme, the legal system 
accepted the right of European-Americans to own African-Americans.  Slave owners enjoyed a 
largely unrestricted authority over the allocation of time and effort of their slaves and their 
offspring, and this property was freely transferable, just as other property.  At the other extreme, 
free colonists were able to sell their labor effort for a limited period of time in ways that 
resembled modern labor market transactions.  In between these extremes, however, were a 
number of intermediate relationships; the numerically most important of which was indentured 
servitude.  Like free laborers, indentured servants were seen as having entered “voluntarily” into 
their employment relationship, but once they had indentured themselves to a master they became 
for the period specified in their contract the property of that master. Law and custom provided   10
servants some protection, but ownership of their labor could be freely transferred, the master 
could enforce obedience to his wishes, and servants were not free to leave their owner before the 
conclusion of their term of service.
3 
  Before American independence these varying systems of property rights co-existed 
throughout all of the colonies that would become the United States.  Although slavery was most 
prevalent in the Southern colonies, there were slaves and slave-owners in every colony prior to 
the Revolution.  In the wake of the American Revolution, however, all of the northern states 
adopted some form of abolition.  Writing about changing attitudes toward slavery, Peter Kolchin 
(1993, 63-70) argued that the rhetoric of the American revolution appears to have contributed to 
changing views of the legitimacy of slavery and thus to northern abolition.  Although many 
southern states did ease restrictions on voluntary manumission following the Revolution, 
Southerners also developed increasingly elaborate intellectual defenses of slavery in response to 
the emerging northern critique of the institution. 
  The North-South divide over slavery that emerged after the Revolution was formalized in 
the Northwest Ordinance.  Passed in 1787 to govern the settlement of western territories, the 
Ordinance prohibited the introduction of slavery into areas north of the Ohio River.  On the 
frontier, slavery offered the possibility of more rapid settlement, a faster transition to commercial 
agriculture, and a quicker rise in property values, all of which appealed strongly to early settlers.  
The restraints of the Northwest Ordinance, however, prevented them from legalizing slavery, and 
as the number of free settlers in the territories increased, political opposition to slavery grew in 
the region (Wright 1978, pp. 12-13).  As a result, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
                                                           
3 See Steinfeld (1991, chs. 1-2) on the status of servants.  Indentures were entered into in Europe prior to passage 
and the merchants carrying the servants recouped their investment by selling the contracts once they had reached the 
colonies.   In another, closely related contractual form, immigrants would borrow money from merchants to finance 
their passage and repay this on arrival by selling themselves into long-term labor contracts in the colonies.  These 
so-called  “redemptioners” retained greater freedom to select between potential employers, but also bore additional 
risks since they did not know when they embarked what labor market conditions would be like once they arrived.   11
United States was characterized by two distinct labor market regimes: one in the South that 
allowed slavery and one in the North that prohibited it. 
  The geographic division between the slave South and the free North contributed to the 
emergence in the early nineteenth century of an increasingly sharply drawn and uniquely 
American conception of “free” labor.  In the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries this 
emerging sense of what it meant to be a free worker was manifested in growing tensions between 
masters and journeymen in a variety of skilled crafts.  As one visitor to the country observed at 
the time: “There is no such relation as master and servant in the United States: indeed the name 
is not permitted;--‘help’ is the designation of one who condescends to receive wages for service” 
(quoted in Steinfeld 1991, p. 127; emphasis in original).  At the same time, court decisions were 
gradually exposing the logical contradictions between the abolition of slavery and the persistence 
of voluntary servitude.  The culmination of this trend came in 1821, when the Indiana Supreme 
Court concluded employers could not impose specific enforcement of a labor contract.   
  Other court decisions in the early nineteenth century reflect the formation of a uniquely 
American regime of high labor turnover and worker mobility.  For example, while English 
Courts continued to hold that an indefinite labor contract was an annual one, and that the worker 
was entitled to compensation only at the completion of the entire year’s work, northern courts 
increasingly ruled that workers who left prior to the termination of their contract were 
nonetheless entitled to compensation for the time that they had served.  They also increasingly 
ruled in ways that set strict limits on an employer’s ability to physically discipline employees.  
The confluence of these trends helped to establish in the antebellum North the notion of 
“employment at will,” in which the employment relationship was viewed as a kind of lease, but 
one that could be maintained only so long as both parties assented to its perpetuation (Steinfeld 
1991, 147-72; 2001).  Even when a legal contract might in principle have bound a worker to an   12
employer for a limited duration, the geographic mobility of American workers and availability of 
the frontier “escape valve” often rendered such contracts unenforceable from the employer’s 
perspective. This problem is a recurring theme in explanations of the weakness of apprenticeship 
in North American labor markets, although its significance has been questioned (Elbaum 1989; 
Hamilton 1995). The norms of low attachment and high mobility established the context in 
which the initial stages of American industrialization took place.  
  
Northern Labor Markets in the Nineteenth Century  
  At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States remained a predominantly 
agricultural economy, and industrial employment competed directly with agricultural 
opportunities.  Native-born white males concentrated in farming, shop-keeping, the professions 
and independent craft work (Gordon, Edwards and Reich 1982, p. 48).  When textile 
manufacturing began to expand in New England after the embargo Act of 1807, the proprietors 
of these businesses were obliged to turn to other sources of labor.  The early Rhode Island 
manufacturers relied primarily on children drawn from nearby farms to run the small spinning 
mills they established.  This source of labor proved inadequate, however, for the larger integrated 
spinning and weaving mills built on the model introduced by the Boston Manufacturing 
Company in 1814. Faced with the challenge of securing several hundred workers to staff a large-
scale production process, Frances Lowell and his partners chose to recruit young women from 
the surrounding region, dispatching labor recruiters to rural areas and building dormitories to 
house the women who came to work in the mills (Rosenbloom 2004).  Industrialization thus 
depended from the outset on expanding the scope of the labor markets, both geographically and 
in the definition of the labor force, rather than accepting local labor supply conditions. 
  The growth of the American textile industry depended not only on expanding the   13
geographic scope of labor markets but on technological innovations that were conditioned by the 
nature of the available labor.  The mutual interaction between labor supply and innovation jointly 
shaped the emerging northern labor market regime.  Habakkuk (1962) was among the first to 
seek to link the direction of American technological innovation in the nineteenth century to 
American labor supply conditions, arguing that relative labor scarcity led to capital-intensive 
(labor-saving) technological innovations.  This conjecture has prompted both theoretical 
arguments seeking to rationalize this conjecture (e.g., David 1975) and a large empirical 
literature.   
  Although the burden of the empirical evidence suggests that Habakkuk was mistaken in 
his argument that the U.S. adopted more capital-intensive methods of production than Britain 
(Field, 1983; James and Skinner 1985), careful examination of a number of industries does 
support the causal connection between labor supply and the direction of technological 
innovation.  Rather than substituting capital for labor it appears that American innovators sought 
to develop ways of conserving on traditional craft skills, which were in short supply in the 
United States.  They did this by substituting raw materials and special purpose machinery, which 
could be used by the less skilled workers who were available in greater abundance (Ames and 
Rosenberg 1968, 1976). One of the chief examples of this substitution is provided by the 
production of firearms.  By the 1850s American innovations in this industry had attracted 
significant attention from the British who sent engineers to inspect American factories with the 
goal of transferring American advances back to Britain.  As Rosenbloom (1993) notes, the 
central feature of American  innovations in the manufacture of firearms was the use of 
specialized machine tools and systems of measurement in lieu of the all around craft skills of 
British gunsmiths.   
  Another, and quantitatively more significant, illustration of this pattern of technological   14
response comes from the development of the American textile industry.  Initially borrowing 
British spinning technologies, this industry grew to prominence through the development of a 
distinct technological paradigm uniquely adapted to American conditions.  Following the British 
model, the earliest textile ventures spun yarn in small factories and then shipped this yarn to 
hand-loom weavers in the surrounding countryside to be made into cloth.  But the shortage of 
skilled weavers (compared to Britain) imposed significant limits on the possible scale of 
production. To overcome the shortage of skilled weavers that constrained earlier ventures, 
Francis Lowell developed a mechanical loom and designed an integrated factory method of 
production to supply yarn that could be woven by this loom. The Boston Manufacturing 
Company, which Lowell and his associates established in 1814, proved enormously successful, 
and the production technology they introduced became the model for the industry’s rapid 
expansion in the following decades. 
  The success of the New England textile manufacturers depended on securing an adequate 
supply of labor to operate the new factories, and it was the genius of Lowell’s approach that his 
technological innovations were adapted to take advantage of the labor that was available at that 
time.  As Field (1978) has pointed out, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, westward 
migration and the growth of Midwestern agriculture created a labor surplus on New England 
farms.  Competition from Midwestern agricultural products was undermining markets for the 
less efficient farms of New England, and the selective migration of young men in response to the 
opportunities created on the frontier was producing a surplus of young women on these declining 
eastern farms.  To take advantage of this potential source of labor, however, Lowell had to build 
dormitories to house them and develop a network of recruiters throughout the region to 
encourage them to take factory jobs.  Because the majority of the young women attracted in this 
way viewed industrial work as a temporary episode, factory labor systems were shaped by the   15
need to continually attract and train new workers, thus reinforcing the tendency of American 
employment relationships toward low attachment and high mobility. 
  By the 1840s demographic shifts in New England combined with the continued 
expansion of textile production produced a new episode of labor shortage.  But the organization 
of the factories made it relatively easy to introduce new sources of labor as they became 
available.  Responding to the rising tide of Irish immigration at this time, mill owners adapted by 
hiring the newly arrived immigrants. As Wright (1979, pp. 676-79) has observed, the causes of 
rising immigration in the 1840s—the Irish potato famine, European political unrest, and falling 
trans-Atlantic passage rates—were largely exogenous to the American textile industry.  But the 
fact that many immigrants were drawn to New England reflects the fact that the region’s textile 
mills created an attractive destination for migrants lacking resources to go into farming and thus 
seeking industrial employment.   
  By the middle of the nineteenth century a distinctive northern labor market regime had 
emerged from the interaction of the legal framework of free labor, technological innovations that 
reduced the need for craft skill and facilitated the integration of new factory workers through on-
the-job training, and the purposeful expansion of the sources of labor supply.  This regime 
facilitated the rising volume of European migration that continued until World War I, and 
provided the foundation for American industrialization in the second half of the century.  It also 
resulted in a high degree of geographic integration across the northeast and Midwestern regions 
of the country, and linked labor markets in the United States increasingly closely with European 
ones (Rosenbloom 2002; Hatton and Williamson 2005). Meanwhile, an entirely distinct and 
largely isolated labor-market regime took shape in the American South. 
 
Antebellum Southern Labor Markets   16
  Coincident with developments in the North, a very different labor market regime was 
developing in the southern United States under the influence of slavery.  The divergent course of 
economic development in the two regions comes as close to providing a “natural experiment” in 
institutional development as economic history is likely to offer.  “In 1790, the two economies 
were nearly equal in population area, and levels of wealth,” notes Wright (2006a, p. 49).  
“Broadly speaking they shared a similar culture and legal heritage.  So the economic competition 
boiled down to the institutional differences between them.”  Having started with relatively 
similar economies and populations the two regions had diverged markedly on the eve of the 
American Civil War.  In comparison to the North, the Southern states in 1860 had a smaller, 
more rural, and less dense population, as well as substantially lower levels of manufacturing 
employment, immigration, and railroad miles per capita (Wright 1986; Bateman and Weiss 
1981).  The point is not that one path of development was superior to the other, but rather that 
the differences in regional development can be traced to the different labor market regimes that 
emerged as a result of the differences property rights in the two regions. 
  In comparison to the northern states, Slavery facilitated westward migration and 
settlement, and by doing so deprived southern industry of the labor supply necessary for 
expansion.  Individual preferences, attachments to family, aversion to risk, and access to capital 
and information, all of which slowed migration in the North, created no obstacle to the 
movement of slaves to western lands where they were more productive.  Moreover, because male 
and female slaves were both used for fieldwork, there was no difference in migration response by 
gender. The circumstances of individual slave owners posed no barrier to mobility either, since 
owners who could not finance a move to the West, or preferred to remain in the East could easily 
sell their slaves to planters in the West.  In effect, while northern manufacturers were able to 
recruit within a fairly localized labor market, southern manufacturers found themselves   17
competing on a region-wide level for slave labor.  Given the extremely high value of labor on 
western cotton plantations, the price of labor that potential southern industrialists faced was 
much higher than in the North.  If employers chose instead to rely on free labor, the lower 
density of population in the South Atlantic region meant that recruitment costs were higher.  
Additionally, because free southern farmers were less involved in production for the market than 
their northern counterparts, they were less subject to the dislocations created by competition 
from western producers that Field identifies as a key factor in releasing labor to industry in the 
Northeast (Field 1978; Wright 1979).   
  Beyond its direct labor market effects, slavery altered the incentives of property owners 
in the South. In the North, property owners had a broadly unified interest in promoting 
immigration, because immigrants raised real property values, expanded markets for domestic 
manufactures, and drove down unit labor costs. In the South, by contrast, slaves dominated the 
portfolios of wealthy property owners, and immigration threatened to reduce the value of these 
assets. Rather than promoting immigration they opposed any action that would increase the labor 
supply. As an editorial in the Southern Banner of Athens Georgia observed in an editorial 
opposing the reopening of the slave trade in 1859: “We want to see labor high…No country can 
be really prosperous and happy where it is otherwise…Cheap labor is a curse to any country.  
We wish it was twice as high in the country as it is” (Quoted in Wright 1979, p. 678). The 
regional difference in the economic interests of the propertied elite could be summarized, in 
Wright’s (2006a) terminology, as a contrast between southern “laborlords” and northern 
“landlords.” These differences resulted in vastly different conditions of labor supply and 
ultimately economic development. 
  Perhaps the clearest indication of the role that slavery played in affecting the course of 
southern development is the marked shift in the nature of southern development after abolition.     18
With this dramatic shift in property rights wealthy southerners displayed a much greater interest 
in investment in railroads, town promotion, and industry.  Urban growth and industrialization, 
which had lagged behind the North before 1860, grew faster than in the North after 1880 (Wright 
1986, pp. 17-26). 
 
Emancipation and Postbellum Southern Labor Markets 
  The Civil War and emancipation imposed an abrupt and sudden shift in labor market 
regimes in the South. The end of slavery transferred property rights in labor from planters to 
their former slaves.  To produce a crop it was necessary to develop new ways of combining labor 
with land and capital.  Southerners’ efforts to forge a solution provide a graphic illustration of 
how many characteristics of the employment relationship we ordinarily take for granted.  A list 
compiled by an official of the Freedman’s Bureau in 1866 and reproduced by Harold Woodman 
notes among these issues: whether the freedpeople would work on Saturdays, whether the 
contract would end on a set date, or when the crops were gathered, whether those working for a 
portion of the crop would be require to do other work and whether they would receive any 
payment in advance of the harvest, who was responsible for maintaining fences, whether a 
physician is to be employed, whether an overseer is to be employed, if the land owner furnishes 
tools or stock animals, who will be responsible if the tools are broken or the animals die, the kind 
and quantity of rations, quarters, and clothing to be provided, the number of hours to be worked, 
whether women and children will work, if wages are paid when they will be paid and what 
portion will be retained until the crop is harvested (Woodman 1984, p. 535; cited in Wright 
1987, p. 320). 
  The dominant labor market regime of the Postbellum South, sharecropping, emerged 
from a process of competition between a number of alternative labor arrangements, including   19
wage labor and cash tenancy, and it continued to coexist with these alternatives throughout the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Once established, however, sharecropping exerted 
an important influence on the technological evolution of southern agriculture. 
  Sharecropping has often been portrayed as effectively reinstating slavery through the debt 
obligations that the croppers undertook.  Yet, sharecropping coexisted with a highly competitive 
wage labor market in the South, and croppers displayed a considerable degree of geographic 
mobility, suggesting that the situation was more fluid and less constraining than this traditional 
view (Wright 1986, pp. 84-107). Settling in one place and becoming a sharecropper was a 
conscious choice that southerners, both Black and White, made as the first step up an agricultural 
ladder that led to cash tenancy and ultimately independent farming. Climbing this ladder required 
that they obtain access to capital to finance seed, equipment and other short-term borrowing; and 
access to capital required that they establish their creditworthiness by committing themselves to 
a particular locale. 
  For both landowners and laborers wage labor was an alternative to sharecropping.  But 
for landowners the seasonal nature of labor inputs required in cotton cultivation made wage labor 
impractical except near urban areas where the supply of labor was sufficiently elastic that they 
could meet their need for temporary workers.  For laborers, wage work offered higher pay, but 
greater uncertainty, and did not provide a means to put other family members to work. Thus the 
wage labor force was composed primarily of young, single men.   
  Sharecropping emerged out of an initial period of flexibility, but once established this 
labor market regime imposed significant constraints on subsequent technological developments.  
In wheat farming mechanical harvesters had from the 1840s begun to reduce labor requirements 
in agriculture.  In contrast, however, cotton picking was not mechanized until nearly a century 
later, in the 1940s.  An important reason for this delay was the fact that while the peak labor   20
demand in wheat production occurred at harvest time, cotton growing had two peak periods of 
labor demand—the first occurring in June when the crops were cultivated, and the second at 
harvest time.  Sharecropping effectively insured that labor effort would be available to meet both 
of these peaks, and efforts to mechanize cotton foundered on the fact that unless they reduced 
labor demand throughout the growing cycle they would not be of much value.  As Whatley 
(1987) documents, International Harvester did not begin to seriously explore development of a 
mechanical cotton picker until the diffusion of tractors in the 1920s had made it feasible to 
mechanize cultivation, and the first successful mechanical cotton pickers were introduced during 
World War II.
4   
  By this time, however, the stability of sharecropping had been significantly undermined 
by the severe economic contraction of the 1930s. As alternative employment opportunities dried 
up, landowners were able to shift a greater proportion of their land to wage labor, reducing the 
number of share cropping contracts.  But the major factor in displacing croppers came from New 
Deal agricultural policies that encouraged landowners to displace croppers to collect agricultural 
subsidy payments for idling the land (Whatley 1983). Not only did this shift create further 
incentives for efforts to mechanize cotton picking, but it also severed the ties holding many poor 
blacks to southern agriculture.  There were scant opportunities to induce them to move in the 
1930s, but once labor demand began to expand during the Second World War, and given the 
context of restrictive immigration policies that choked off old sources of supply (Collins 197), 
the Great Migration of African-Americans to northern cities in search of industrial employment 
commenced, as did the integration of Southern labor markets more fully into the national 
economy.  
                                                           
4 Because tractors were of general utility throughout northern and southern agriculture, the limitations of cotton 
cultivation did not significantly impede development of this technology.   21
 
The evolution of industrial labor markets to World War I 
  By the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was emerging as the world’s 
preeminent industrial economy, although still an economy with sizable agricultural and mineral 
extraction sectors. The period between the Civil War and the First World War is often seen as an 
era of unfettered, competitive labor markets, characterized by a legal regime of employment at 
will, loose attachments between workers and employers, mass immigration of low-skilled 
workers, weak unions, flexible wages, and minimal government regulation—in other words, the 
kind of market well-suited to the standard theory of supply and demand (Fishback 1998).  
The general validity of this view as a snapshot of the institutions at a point in time is hard 
to deny. But it also obscures some important dynamics that became forces for institutional 
change. Production technologies and ultimately labor-market institutions evolved during these 
decades under the pressure of four interrelated influences: relatively inelastic and scarce supply 
of skilled labor; conflict between employers and skilled workers over control of the production 
process; the growing scale of firms as organizations, with attendant problems of monitoring and 
incentives; and emerging forms of government regulation of labor markets, particularly at the 
state level.  
Labor historians and radical economists have often interpreted the technological and 
institutional trajectory of late nineteenth-century America as the result of a purposeful effort by 
employers to forestall or weaken organized labor and wrest control of the production process 
from skilled artisans (Edwards 1979; Gordon, Edwards and Reich 1982; Montgomery 1987). 
While the evidence of such class struggle in the workplace is plentiful, the same developments 
also reflect the fact that the labor market regime was more effective in mobilizing unskilled labor 
than in providing workers with traditional craft skills. During the second half of the nineteenth   22
century, large scale factory production was associated with more intensive use of low-skilled 
labor, as Atack, Bateman, and Margo (2004) have documented. Technological innovation and 
capital investment thus appear to have had an overall skill-saving bias. Nonetheless, over the 
same period, wage premiums for skilled craft workers were actually rising, suggesting that 
however much employers had “deskilling” in mind, overall growth in the demand for skills 
continued to outpace supply (Dawson 1979; Rosenbloom 2002). Experimentation with various 
methods of attaching workers to the firm and training them internally, such as rudimentary 
promotion ladders and welfare capitalism, can also be seen as responses to perceived skill 
shortages, attacking the problem from the supply side. These developments were reflected in the 
job-tenure data: despite overall high rates of labor turnover, sizable minorities of workers in 
industrial establishments could expect to have a job with the same employer for many years 
(Carter and Savoca 1990). 
Indeed, by the turn of the century, the advanced industrial sectors of the U.S. economy 
were increasingly characterized by technology-skill complementarity (Goldin and Katz 1998). 
New technologies were more “skilling” than deskilling. Goldin and Katz (2008) argue that this 
complementarity, initially associated with the rise of large-scale batch and continuous process 
production technologies, would impart a skill bias to technological change that persisted across 
the twentieth century and beyond. That the relative wages of skilled workers failed to rise 
steadily during the twentieth century is evidence of the extraordinary increase in the supply of 
skills, largely driven by rising educational attainment.  
In the advanced sectors of the industrial economy, growing organizational scale created 
other challenges—most notably, management of the employment relationship had to be 
delegated to a growing cadre of subordinates. In many industries this was accomplished by 
leaving labor management in the hands of first-line supervisors, a system that Nelson (1975)   23
referred to as the “foreman’s empire.” Delegation created growing principal-agent problems, and 
firms began to experiment with reforms that removed some of the foreman’s discretion over 
hiring and firing, pay, training, and task assignments. Still, the bureaucratic managerial 
revolution would not have a widespread impact on the employment relationship until well after 
World War I (Jacoby 1985). 
  As for the role of government, late nineteenth-century U.S. labor markets undoubtedly 
came closer to the laissez faire ideal than they would 50 years later, but as in other areas of 
economic life, the decades leading up to World War I witnessed a flurry of regulatory activity. 
Under the federalist system, government regulation of labor-market institutions was largely left 
to the states. States passed laws limiting the work hours of children and women and established 
bureaus of labor statistics, factory inspection systems, and arbitration boards. By1915, all of the 
major industrial states had established workers’ compensation programs (Fishback and Kantor 
1996). These regulations set the stage for broader interventions to come but on the whole were 
fairly weak. Comparing the United States with advanced European countries during the same 
period, Robertson (2000) contends that the purported exceptionalism of American labor laws and 
institutions did not emerge until after World War I. While state policies and programs were 
piecemeal and often ineffectual, labor regulation was similarly weak elsewhere in the western 
world as well. 
To summarize, the period between the Civil War and World War I was one during which 
the elements of the institutional regime were becoming increasingly discordant.  While mass 
immigration, high mobility, and employment at will fostered a labor market of readily available 
unskilled labor and posed challenges for training skilled workers, new technological 
opportunities militated toward increased organizational scale and greater importance of skills 
that were learned on the job or in school. Much of the conflict of this era can thus be seen as   24
symptomatic of the groping toward a solution within the constraints of the existing labor market 
institutions. The eventual institutional regime shift would come in response to the series of 
severe shocks to the system generated by two world wars, the Great Depression, and a dramatic 
realignment of the government’s role in the economy.  
 
The command economy and the Great Depression: The emergence of a high-wage regime 
  World War I is often seen as a watershed in the evolution of labor-market institutions in 
the United States. With the onset of the War, mass immigration from Europe was curtailed, and 
coupled with the wartime stimulus to industry, the scissors of demand and supply closed, driving 
unemployment down and wages dramatically up. Tight market conditions increased the 
bargaining power of labor, and strikes and unionization rates spiked. In an effort to minimize the 
disruption to critical war production, the federal government implemented a short-lived but 
historically influential experiment in regulating industrial labor markets and arbitrating disputes, 
in the form of the National War Labor Board. The corporatist character of the Board, which 
sought to bring captains of industry together with labor leaders under the guiding umbrella of the 
federal government, would be echoed in the early phase of the New Deal (NIRA) as well as 
similar efforts during the Second World War. 
  The influence of organized labor in most industries fell apart rapidly with some 
disastrous strikes–such as the steel strike in 1919–and the short but deep postwar recession of 
1921. Still, some of the War’s effects on labor markets were lasting. Most importantly, perhaps, 
restrictive immigration quotas passed in 1921 and 1924–spurred in part by xenophobia and 
concerns about European radicalism–made permanent the wartime cutoff of mass immigration of 
low-skilled labor. Given this restriction of labor supply growth and ongoing productivity 
advances, labor earnings rose quite dramatically. Indeed, Gavin Wright has argued that the 1920s   25
witnessed the emergence of a “high-wage national regime” that would last half a century and 
coincide with the “one big wave” of 20
th century productivity growth (Wright 2006b; Gordon 
1999). The evidence on real wages is striking. Standard manufacturing wage series show that 
real hourly wages of production workers were nearly stagnant between 1890 and the Great War, 
but by the early 1920s they had risen by more than 50 percent and then continued to grow 
modestly until further increases occurred during the 1930s (Wright 2006b; see also Goldin and 
Katz 2008). Wright argues that high wages induced a set of institutional and technological 
responses that drove further productivity changes; hence the correlation between the great wave 
of productivity growth and high wages is not mere coincidence. 
  The implications of the high-wage regime for labor relations during the 1920s, even 
before the dramatic labor-law reforms of the New Deal, were nicely summarized by Sumner 
Slichter (1929). Employers faced with high wages sought to “upgrade” their employees to match 
productivity to pay; fear of the return of labor unrest and high turnover spurred not only 
efficiency wages but experimentation with more systematic personnel management, internal 
labor markets, and various incentives designed to attach workers to firms. These schemes 
elaborated on and bureaucratized some of the practices developed by the welfare capitalism and 
scientific management movements of the late 19
th Century. The extent to which these reforms 
were widely adopted by U.S. firms before World War II remains subject to some debate (see 
Jacoby 1985; Moriguchi 2003, 2005). Large corporate employers were generally the leaders in 
adopting more formal, systematic methods; but there was considerable heterogeneity across 
firms of all sizes, and informal modes of personnel management were remarkably persistent (see 
esp. Licht 1991). 
  There seems little doubt, however, that the advent of the high-wage regime coincided 
with changes in other broad measures of labor-market structure and performance. After peaking   26
in 1919 or 1920, both union density and strike activity fell throughout the 1920s. Data on labor 
turnover rates are spotty before 1920, but the available evidence suggests that turnover fell 
dramatically between the teens and 1920s, led by falling rates of voluntary quits. Because the 
quit rate tended to be dominated by a fairly small unstable segment of the workforce (Woytinsky 
1942) and was sensitive to short-run fluctuations in business-cycle conditions, its movements are 
not necessarily indicative of changes in the prevalence of long-term labor attachments. Still, 
Owen (1995) builds a case for the view that changes in employment management practices were 
a significant contributing factor. 
  The broader institutional manifestation of labor upgrading was the continuing rapid 
development of the American system of mass public education—in this period, largely the high-
school movement. Goldin and Katz (2008) attribute the United States’ global leadership in 
secondary education to a set of longstanding social and political “virtues”—including social and 
political egalitarianism and local political control—that facilitated publicly funded schooling for 
the masses, as well as the strong price incentive provided by a substantial educational wage 
premium. The extent to which mass schooling in America was shaped predominantly by 
economic forces and interests (cf. Bowles and Gintis 1976) may be debated, but the apparent 
complementarity between educational and labor-market institutions is nicely illustrated by the 
regional contrast between the American South and the rest of the country. Public support of 
schooling in the South lagged substantially, a phenomenon attributable in considerable measure 
to the disfranchisement of African-Americans, but also to the commitment of political and 
economic elites in the region to maintaining an isolated, low-wage labor-market regime (Wright 
1983; Margo 1994). 
  By the late 1920s, it seemed that U.S. industrial labor market institutions were settling 
into a stable regime of relatively high wages, managerial paternalism, minimal government   27
intervention, and low rates of unionization and labor unrest—what might be referred to as 
corporate welfarism. The economic crisis of the 1930s, however, brought an early demise to this 
episode. Two well-known and interrelated developments characterize labor market institutions in 
the 1930s: the resurgence of mass unionism, and the advent of significant federal regulation. As 
Wright (2006b) notes, these developments helped to ratchet up real wages again during the early 
1930s–a truly remarkable phenomenon within the context of massive excess supply of labor.
5 
  The surges in labor unrest and union membership during the 1930s are often attributed to 
changes in the legal environment, especially protective labor legislation, such as Section 7(a) of 
the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and its successor, the 1935 Wagner Act. It is 
also true that some cracks in the generally anti-union, open-shop orientation of American labor 
law had begun to appear by the late 1920s (see Ebell and Ritschl 2008). But, as David Brody 
(1980) has argued, labor organizing in the 1930s was initially spurred as much by economic 
conditions and changes in employer behavior as it was by a more favorable political climate. In 
particular, the abandonment of welfare capitalist benefits by financially strapped corporations 
was viewed by many workers as reneging on an implicit contract that had maintained the peace, 
and led to the collapse of the prior institutional equilibrium (Moriguchi 2005). 
  The expanded role of federal regulation also included a national minimum wage and the 
set of social insurance measures associated with the Social Security Act of 1935: unemployment 
insurance, retirement insurance, and welfare support for single mothers. The social safety net 
was undoubtedly emblematic of labor’s increased political power, but may in turn have served to 
strengthen labor’s bargaining power by improving workers’ threat points. 
  The key role of the federal government in shaping labor-market institutions continued 
                                                           
5 Wage growth was, however, consistent with the extraordinary rise in total factor productivity during the 1930s 
(Field 2003).   28
during World War II. As Jacoby (1985, 261) puts it, “During the war the nation came close to 
having a command labor market...” Building on the precedent of World War I, a National War 
Labor Board was reestablished with the primary goal of avoiding strikes that could undermine 
the war effort; the NWLB compelled bargaining between firms and unions, the latter’s right to 
bargain collectively now legally protected by the NLRA. Government reporting requirements 
and the dissemination of best-practice personnel management practices served to standardize and 
bureaucratize labor relations in large firms (Jacoby 1985; Baron et al 1986). In the aftermath of 
the War, the power and influence of American industrial unions were at their zenith. Levy and 
Temin (2007) argue that the postwar agreements between the UAW and the Big Three auto 
firms, the so-called “Treaty of Detroit,” were particularly important in establishing the practice 
of pattern bargaining, whereby key contracts had wide spillover effects on wages and working 
conditions across industries. In this interpretation, during the 1950s U.S. labor markets had in 
important respects come to resemble the collective, centralized wage-setting institutions often 
associated with labor markets in continental Western Europe. 
  Coinciding with these institutional changes was a dramatic reduction in the dispersion of 
wages between 1940 and 1950, a phenomenon dubbed the “Great Compression” by Goldin and 
Margo (1992). Wage differentials declined rapidly both between and within observable skill 
groups, as classified by education and experience. The new wage structure persisted well beyond 
the wartime period of tight labor markets. The fact that wage inequality ratcheted downward, 
rather than exhibiting a temporary wartime compression followed by a postwar decompression, 
suggests that neither tight wartime markets nor wartime wage controls offer a complete 
explanation. Rather, the evidence is consistent with a significant role of more long-lived 
institutional change, including the power of organized labor and advances in the legal minimum 
wage, which relative to labor productivity reached an all-time high during the 1950s (Levy and   29
Temin 2007). Trends in labor-market fundamentals, especially the relative supply of human 
capital, may have been at least as important in the long run: Goldin and Katz (2008) emphasize 
changes in educational attainment that served to compress the skill premium during the 
immediate postwar decades. 
 
The demise of the high-wage regime? 
  Developments in U.S. labor markets since 1970 have suggested to many observers an 
unraveling of the postwar institutional regime. Much of the work by labor economists has 
stressed the dramatic increase in wage and income inequality, both within and across skill 
groups, but the paradox of slow median wage growth, even as productivity growth accelerated 
during the 1990s, is another piece of the puzzle. Levy and Temin (2007) document the slowdown 
in wage growth using what they refer to as a bargaining power index, which they measure as the 
ratio of median worker pay to (average) labor productivity. This ratio deteriorated fairly steadily 
beginning in the late 1960s, with the decline especially pronounced for low-skilled men.  
The widening of the gap between median worker pay and productivity is not, as one 
might surmise, due to a change in the distribution between labor and capital; labor’s share of 
national income has in fact been remarkably stable over time. Rather, pay at the top of the wage 
distribution has steadily pulled away from the middle for some 30 years (Autor et al 2006; 
Piketty and Saez 2003). At the same time, especially during the 1980s, the pay of workers in the 
lower deciles of the wage distribution stagnated, further contributing to the “polarization” of the 
labor market.  
Explaining the trends in wages and inequality since the late 1970s remains an active and 
contentious area of research. Wright (2006b) and others have pointed to an institutional regime 
change in response to the economic crisis of the 1970s, characterized by deregulation, the   30
erosion of the real minimum wage, weakened private-sector unionism, increased low-skilled 
immigration, increased international trade, and– more vaguely– the weakening of distributional 
norms that placed constraints on the acceptable degree of wage inequality.
6 A competing, 
neoclassical account stresses the changing structure of labor demand due largely to skill bias in 
the impact of computerization, coupled with a significant slowdown in the rate of growth of 
human capital, as the educational attainment of recent cohorts has stagnated (Autor et al 2006, 
2008; Goldin and Katz 2008). 
These debates relate to two fundamental and unresolved issues regarding the role of 
institutions in capitalist labor markets. The first is the extent to which specific institutional 
arrangements can have a significant and long-term impact on market outcomes, such as wages, 
working conditions, and employment, beyond what is determined by the underlying 
fundamentals of technology and human capital. Although Goldin and Katz (2008) acknowledge 
a significant supporting role for such labor-market institutions as labor unions and regulations 
during certain historical episodes, in the longer run these institutions are merely waves riding the 
larger tidal force of the race between education and technology—that is, between supply and 
demand. Still, we know from international comparisons that wage distributions, hours, and 
employment can vary dramatically (and persistently) across economies with apparently similar 
technologies and levels of educational attainment, for what seem to be institutionally driven 
reasons. Regulatory regimes clearly matter across countries, but their significance in explaining 
temporal change within the U.S. setting is debatable.  
A dimension of the impact of institutions on labor market outcomes deserving of greater 
attention is their potential role in determining the size and distribution of economic rents. An 
                                                           
6 On institutional explanations, see also Levy and Temin (2007); Piketty and Saez (2003); and the recent survey by 
Lemieux (2008).   31
important body of work in the 1980s and 1990s suggested that rent sharing has been a significant 
factor in wage determination in the United States, at least for inter-industry wage patterns 
(Krueger and Summers 1988, and Blanchflower et al 1996). The importance of rent sharing 
implies a role for non-competitive—and thus perhaps “institutional”—forces in labor markets, 
whether unions, personnel management practices, or social norms. How institutional change may 
have affected economic rents and their distribution is poorly understood, in part because of the 
difficulty of identifying and measuring the rents themselves. 
The second issue in assessing the role of institutions is the extent to which the underlying 
economic fundamentals of technologies and endowments (such as human capital) are 
endogenously determined by institutions. If, for example, as Acemoglu (2002) and Wright 
(2006b) contend, the skill bias of technological change is endogenous to the pattern of relative 
prices, and institutional regimes help determine relative prices, the identification strategy of 
treating technological change as an exogenous residual is problematic.  
 
Conclusion 
  In much economic analysis it is a convenient fiction to suppose that wages and 
employment are determined by shifts in supply or demand within a more or less competitive 
market framework.  And indeed this framework can be conveniently deployed to understand 
many episodes in American economic history.  Thus, for example, within the northern United 
States the influx of relatively unskilled European immigrants between the end of the Civil War 
and the beginning of World War I raised skill premia while promoting spatial wage equalization.  
Similarly, within the postbellum South adjustments in acreage farmed by sharecroppers can be 
understood as a response to variations in relative supply and demand. 
  As the foregoing account demonstrates, however, the interaction of supply and demand   32
takes place within an institutional context that is, itself, endogenously determined.  And the 
prevailing institutional context can profoundly alter the wage and employment outcomes 
produced by markets, a point that is starkly illustrated by the divergent development of northern 
and southern labor markets in the antebellum period.  Although labor market institutional 
regimes are determined endogenously they tend to be persistent, reflecting the interdependent 
nature of the institutions that support market exchange.  
  As a result, the history of American labor markets can best be characterized as a sequence 
of relatively stable arrangements punctuated by abrupt changes in institutional regimes. Such a 
narrative suggests that policy advice that focuses solely on efforts to influence supply and 
demand conditions, and ignores the role of institutional regimes in conditioning the operation of 
supply and demand, ignores one of the central features of the labor market. 
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